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1. Introduction
Research on new modes of governance has tended to emphasise either new forms of
engagement between government and political actors and groups in civil society, or
new instruments of public administration. Treib and colleagues, for example,
distinguish between institutional properties (polity), actor constellations (politics), and
policy instruments (policy) in the analysis of modes of governance (Treib et al 2005).
But analysts of new trends have tended to focus mainly on the latter two areas. The
rise of network governance and the blurring of the boundaries of formal and informal
participation, for example, is often seen as an indication of new patterns of
engagement in policy making and implementation (Peterson 2003; Sabel & Zeitlin
2007; Waelti et al 2004). The growth of new instruments in regulatory governance
such as risk assessment, quality audits, and benchmarking might be seen as
innovations in the modalities through which new policy objectives are identified and
implemented (Radaelli & de Francesco 2007). In practice, of course, these various
strands are often inter-related. It is our contention that changes in institutional
arrangements can reveal more about the dynamics of governance than had previously
been supposed. It is not necessarily the case that new modes of governance are
weakly institutionalised and best examined through analysis of ‘soft’ policy practices.
This has long been recognized in areas of governance such as regulatory policy –
where new institutional arrangements are designed to achieve new policy objectives,
often with the involvement of new actors to whom public power may indeed be
devolved in new ways (Thatcher 2005; 2007). But apart from the case of regulatory
governance, institutionalized practices have tended to be rather under-analysed in
comparative literature.
This paper draws on time-series data generated within the IRCHSS-funded ‘Mapping
the Irish State’ project to offer an organizational perspective on changing modes of
governance. We take as our starting point the pattern of reliance by government on
state agencies, and especially the proliferation of agencies since the 1980s which has
been one of the more salient developments in the organization of political life in the
European Union generally. The changing profile of state agencies has implications for
our understanding of the range of state responsibilities and how they are managed.2
Through an analysis of state agencies, we draw out a typology of trends in
governance, aspects of which we believe have been relatively under-explored to date.
2. Commonality and diversity in state agencies
The identification of agencies is itself a contentious activity. Categorization according
to different definitions, animated by different theoretical purposes, will capture
different ranges of observations and, quite simply, a different total number of bodies
that are deemed to qualify for inclusion. Among the merits of our database as a
research tool is that a range of identifying features can be built into the coding of
agencies, which will facilitate comparison of different schemata.
In this paper we adopt a typology based principally on functions, to enable us to
analyse areas of state activity in which agencies have become more active over time.
We can therefore identify changes in the mode of governance, identified in terms of
the scope of state activity and the organizational structures through which public
policy has been enacted. Possible recent drivers of agencification include the
construction of new regulatory capacities, sometimes but not always or necessarily
under an EU mandate; incorporation of organized interests into consultative fora;
separation of service delivery from core policy making; depoliticization of
contentious decision-making about resource allocation through creation of technically
specialized and visibly independent bodies. Some even recently recently created
agencies may reflect mutations of state functions that are long-established.
Continuities as well as innovations in state activities merit consideration, and it is only
in a longer-term perspective that we can truly appreciate whether new organizations
represent innovation or adaptation.
It is by now generally accepted that the creation of new state agencies is not primarily
driven by technical imperatives. Even where we may identify cross-national
commonalities in the model of agency construction, this is generally more usefully
analysed as an instance of policy diffusion or policy transfer, rather than as
convergence round a technically mandated organizational requirement. For example,
in many European countries, major utilities such as electricity supply and
telecommunications had been held in public hands, or subject to monopoly supply, or3
both, over the postwar decades. Privatization and deregulation during the 1990s
resulted in many countries adopting similar kinds of independent regulatory agencies.
But there was nothing automatic about such convergence. Rather, we may note
several congruent political processes at work, such as a convergence of expert opinion
about policy appropriateness, a willingness to adopt practices from other jurisdictions,
particularly in European countries, along with EU baseline competition policy
requirements (Levi-Faur 2005; Thatcher & Sweet 2002). Nonetheless, we may also
note a good deal of variety in the organizational forms of regulatory agencies in many
areas: financial services regulation, for example, evinces very different degrees of
political independence across Europe (Perez & Westrup 2004; Way 2005). This must
be understood against a backdrop of variations in national political economy and
political culture: the constellation of domestic actors, with their competing
preferences and interests based on different structural contexts, may produce quite
different responses to similar challenges. (Hancke et al 2007; Scott 2003).
Regulation is but one broadly defined functional area in which states have become
more active in recent decades. Across other areas of political life, common challenges
may similarly produce organizational convergence in some policy areas but
continuing diversity in institutional structures in others, both of which must be
explained with reference to the dynamics of domestic politics as it interacts with
pressures emanating from the wider economic and transnational political context.
Identifying patterns in national public administration overall is of course notoriously
difficult in view of the historically grounded diversity of structures, public
administration practices, and legal and constitutional frameworks involved. Roness,
for example, identifies at least four very different nationally-specific classifications
drawn from the national experiences of Britain, Norway, New Zealand, and the
Netherlands (Roness 2007). And yet there is considerable scope to explore trends in
commonality and variation more extensively. Analysts of regulatory governance have
contributed richly to our understanding of organizational diversity within one
thematic concern, albeit broadly defined. Our objective in this paper is to attempt to
set out a framework for classifying and comparing both commonality and variation in
state structures which will enable us to explore how similar activities might be carried
out through different institutional forms, or how similar institutional solutions might
be devised for commonly shared problems. Furthermore, our approach to analysing4
state functions through their embeddedness in organizational forms helps us to
identify trends in state functions that may be emerging relatively unnoticed. We
consider that the emphasis on regulatory governance in recent years may have
overshadowed some equally interesting new trends in state functions; while we can
identify these trends empirically in the Irish case, we consider that they are likely to
be present in other countries too. Finally, we explore briefly the tension often
assumed to exist between legitimacy and efficiency considerations, or input and
output legitimacy, where new structures and new roles for public bodies emerge.
Among the concerns are that the lines of accountability to democratic, elected
authorities are attenuated; patronage and clientelism undermine efficiency; and a
decline in the quality of decision-making results due to the fragmentation of state
capacity (Clancy & Murphy 2006; Papadopoulos 2003). But this must not be assumed
to be the case: it is also possible that agencies may enhance policy credibility and
effectiveness by removing important activities from short-term election horizons and
party-political competition (Coen & Thatcher 2005; Gilardi 2002). We suggest
therefore that issues of accountability and legitimacy are more likely to be
experienced as a continuum than a dichotomy.
3. Typologies of agencies
The puzzle of agencies is related to the conception of the state, its organizational
expression, and its functions. The simplest model of state organization would take
constitutional structures as foundational. Typically, in English-speaking countries
(though not Britain itself), government ministries and their related administrative
departments would be deemed the core institutions at national level, with local
government and local administration providing a second tier of state organization.
State agencies have typically been created as executcive bodies within government
departments. However, it has long been recognized that this model is quite inadequate
to capture many important features of state activities. For a start, it does not travel
well beyond common-law systems. Continental European constitutional arrangements
are framed by legal systems that draw rather different boundary lines between
government power, state bureaucracy, and private interests, and which organize the
relationship between departments and agencies differently. Swedish constitutional
law, for example, recognized executive agencies with a significant degree of5
organizational and operational autonomy from government as central to their public
administration from an early date. Moreover, in Britain, the derivation of many state
functions from pre-modern political arrangements left many anomalies. Some of these
were translated though in different form to other common law jurisdictions such as
Ireland, Canada, and Australia, and new ones added besides. But countries with strong
administrative law traditions also often incorporated pre-modern forms of
administrative organization into modern state organization: the semi-public
responsibilities of employer organizations and trade unions in German industrial
relations might be one such example (Crouch 1993).
Furthermore, ad hoc agency building is no new phenomenon in many countries, and is
certainly not confined to the most recent phase in which it has attracted the attention
of political scientists. In the United States, for example, the proliferation of agencies
with diverse lines of accountability was recognized as early as the 1930s to have
created a bureaucratic tangle which the Brownlow Commission sought to rationalize
within the Executive Office of the President. However, the rapid expansion of
presidential powers and functions driven by New Deal executive activism quickly
brought new complexity to the system.
There is merit in taking a comprehensive view of state agencies, rather than assuming
a priori a dichotomous distinction between ‘ministries’ or ‘departments’ or ‘core
executive’ on the one hand, and ‘agencies’ on the other. The puzzle of agencification
is as much a puzzle about where, how, and why the boundary lines are drawn, as it is
an analysis of what exactly the organizationally distinct agencies are doing.
3. 1 The diversity of state agencies: continuous not dichotomous
State agencies have come into sharp focus periodically in comparative political
science and public administration, with rather different theoretical questions in mind.
The expansion of state economic activities in most western countries in the decades
after World War 2 brought about many new organizational forms, especially in the
area of state ownership of productive enterprise and commercial activities. These
were not necessarily confined to natural monopolies, energy sources, or industries
considered to be of strategic national interest, such as steel production. Perhaps the
most exuberant example of state commercial activity was Italy, where at its height in6
the1980s there was virtually no sector of economic life in which state interests were
not present. The wave of privatization that swept across Western Europe during the
1980s and 1990s changed the definition of the public sector quite profoundly (Helm
1989; Wright 1994). The theoretical issues that were paramount in considering the
division between public and private, and the scope of the public sector, centred on the
efficiency of resource allocation, the accountability of state corporations to market
pressures, to customer interests, and to political interests.
The debate about the scope of the state gained a new focus with the development
during the 1980s of theories of New Public Management, with its conception of the
dissociation between departmental policy-making and executive agencies delivering
those policies at a remove from the core department. Most developed in Britain, these
organizational innovations sharpened debate about political accountability of the
devolved units to the centre (Hood et al 1999). But if we are to consider institutional
structures defined in terms of the degree of autonomy from central government
enjoyed by an agency or organization, we must take note of a much wider variety of
organizational forms. Rather than a twofold distinction, we may identify a continuum,
with departmental organizations at one end, then a variety of non-departmental
bodies, and non-governmental or civil society organizations at the other, many of
which in turn may play a role in policy delivery under delegated powers (explicitly,
using legislation, or implicitly through observation and/or encouragement of the use
of private powers), public contract or in exchange for financial grants (Hood 1986;
Wettenhall 2003, p.229). Indeed, this definition begins to bring private organizations
into focus too, since it is not only in New Zealand that, as Wettenhall notes, we may
see ‘private and community organizations providing services under contract to one of
the main governmental bodies’ (Wettenhall 2003, p.232).
‘Agencification’ within the EU has generated a whole new rich debate about the
consequences of isolation of deliberation from centres of democratic accountability,
which mirrors the concerns expressed within states (Geradin et al 2005).
Thus the issue about agencies has moved beyond a purely taxonomical concern with
identifying the boundaries of executive agencies, to focus on the tensions involved in
delegating expert functions to specialist bodies. Majone has suggested that some7
agencies are properly kept beyond direct democratic control the better to be able to
maintain professional or ethical standards that are not subject to the logic of
majoritarian political competition and to develop or sustain credible commitments to
policy domains, such as regulation, which benefit from a demonstrated commitment
to stability (Majone 1994). Yet the creation of new agencies may equally represent
avoidance of difficult political choices, and an opportunity to staff the boards and
directorates with politically friendly appointees (Clancy & Murphy 2006). Clearly a
more fine-grained analysis is required.
If the central question about the creation and functioning of state agencies centres on
the degree to which they are politically accountable, then the definition of agencies
will pay close attention to the nature of political control and the extent of political
autonomy they enjoy. It would therefore be appropriate to adopt a classification
system similar to that of one of the authors of this paper, distinguishing between
ownership, legal form, funding, functions, powers, and governance level (Scott 2003).
The full database of Irish state institutions will encode all this information for a wide
variety of organizational structures relating to the Irish state. For purposes of the
present paper though we focus primarily on functional classification.
3.2 Functional classification of state bodies
Each system of classification is designed to capture a different theoretically specified
set of structures and practices of the modern state. A standard classification, the
United National Classification of Functions of Government (UN COFOG), provides a
template for organizing state bodies by policy domain. The principal divisions are:
General Public Services; Defence; Public Order and Safety; Economic Affairs;
Environmental Protection; Housing and Community Amenities; Health; Recreation,
Culture and Religion; Education; Social Protection; Defence.
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=4&Top=1&Lg=1 .
This has the merit of comparability across countries and is particularly useful in
comparing budgetary allocations cross-nationally. However, it is intended to flatten
out all information about organizational variety.
Dunleavy’s functional classification was motivated by his interest in allocation of
public budgets, and by a concern to improve on older ‘bureaumetric’ analyses. His8
interest in a ‘bureau-shaping’ model of control over expenditure streams led him to
focus on the domains of public sector activity over which bureaucrats might be
expected to have some policy influence. His study of the British ‘central state’,
defined as ‘the ministerial departments in Whitehall and their directly controlled
subordinate agencies’ (Dunleavy 1989, p.249), involved a functional classification of
state agencies as follows: delivery, regulatory, transfer, contracts, control, taxing,
trading, servicing (Dunleavy 1989, pp. 254-5).
Though we find this classification helpful, as it puts the static ordering of public
administration into a dynamic context, we have found it necessary to elaborate on the
number of functions, as for many public agencies in Ireland their primary function is
not captured by the list. Central examples include bodies the primary function of
which is to engage in adjudication or grievance handling, which have considerable
analytical importance for our study. A further addition we have made to this list –
developmental function, was, perhaps, not strictly necessary but gives us greater
purchase of observations of change within the pattern of agency functions. Helpful as
it is, this way of clustering state structures pays little or not attention to issues of
ownership, extent of political control, employment status, or sources of funding, so
we analyse these elements separately. But it does give us a good deal of purchase on
their activities.
Even prior to analysing functional categorization of state agencies in Ireland,
enumerating them poses a challenge. On the broadest definition of a state agency we
would include all government ministries, the executive agencies established within
them, the wide range of statutory corporations and other non-departmental public
bodies and the distinctive constitutional agencies (such as the ombudsman, judciciary
and comptroller and auditor general) which operate outside the control of government.
We would include educational establishments that are state-funded but autonomous.
In the Irish context, we would include not just universities and other third-level
institutions, but also most second-level and primary schools, most of which are
privately owned and under private management (generally denominational in
character), and many hospitals and a range of social services, for the same reason. In
addition the statutory corporations, the private company forms (public (listed), private9
(unlisted) and company limited by guarantee) have been deployed for public
purposes, and under public ownership since the early years of the state.
For the purposes of our present discussion, where our interest is primarily in tracking
changing state functions through organizational differentiation, this is too broad and
inclusive a conception. Alternatively, as Dunleavy does, we might consider only
central government departments and the agencies directly accountable to them. For
our purposes, this is too restrictive a definition. Our organizational map of the Irish
state reveals a range of accountability structures – a continuum not a dichotomy – and
drawing the line at civil service agencies alone is not only creates an artificial cut-off
point but also excludes many of the most interesting examples of functional variety.
Irish public sector organizations are defined for official purposes as follows:
An Irish public sector organisation is defined as any employing body which:
(a) directly derives the majority of its share capital from Irish public funds, or
(b) has the majority of its Board/Executive members appointed by an Irish
Minister, or (c) directly derives the majority of its revenue from Irish public
sources. The Irish public sector comprises the following administrative sub-
sectors: the Oireachtas (or National Parliament) and the Judiciary, the Civil
Service, the Garda Síochána (or National Police Force), the Defence Forces,
the Local Authorities, the Health Services, education, the Harbour Authorities
and the State-Sponsored Bodies … Private sector employing organisations are
defined as the residuum (Humphreys and Gorman, 1987:8). (Subsequently
adopted by the Central Statistics Office.(McGauran et al 2005, p.31) .
We have used this definition to identify state agencies that are part of the central
constitutionally defined apparatus of the state, but which are public sector
organizations according to the criteria set out here. Even using these guidelines, the
number of agencies counted can vary. One recent study identified 482 central public
bodies, while excluding regulators of both public and private sectors, working groups
and tribunals (both investigatory and adjudicatory). Another found in excess of 600
(Clancy & Murphy 2006; McGauran et al 2005). Our database, using stricter criteria
than either of these, identifies a little over 400. A full discussion of our criteria and
rationale for inclusion will be available in a Working Paper.
State agencies are not at all a new phenomenon in Irish politics, but were already a
recognized feature of government at the time of the foundational Ministers and10
Secretaries Act 1924, shortly after the establishment of the state in 1922. This is
perhaps unsurprising, as Ireland already had a mature public administration system
derived from the British Whitehall model. It had similarly benefited from the
Trevelyan reforms of the mid-19
th century, creating a largely meritocratic and legal-
rational public bureaucracy. Many of the idiosyncracies of British public
administration were also directly inherited by Ireland, such as the use of the Crown
Charter to establish institutions such as the Royal College of Surgeons or the Royal
Irish Academy.
But it is also noteworthy that the number of state agencies shows a sharp upward
trend beginning in the 1980s and accelerating thereafter, as Fig.1 shows.
(Figure 1 about here).
One study of Irish state agencies attempting to classify agencies by function (though
on a slightly different basis from our database), suggested that a great many were
primarily advisory in nature:
(Table 2 about here)
But a closer analysis of the functions of state agencies reveals a number of interesting
features. Firstly, functional innovation through organizational creativity is not
confined to a single historical phase. In any particular area of activity we find that the
emphasis on what the state does can shift over time in response to new historical
circumstances. Secondly therefore, we seek to locate ‘agencification’ in a clearer
political and economic context, which we see as types of policy regime or distinct
aspects of ‘stateness’. And thirdly, drawing on this regime-like approach, we note that
some state agencies do not seem to have been subject to as much systematic analysis
as others. We think Ireland displays some distinctive features in the way it has
institutionalised the activities associated with the ‘developmental state’ and the
‘regulatory state’. We also propose two new categories of state activity which we
identify through the evolution of state agencies: the ‘adjudicatory state’ and the
‘moralizing state’ – neither of which is either new or indeed distinctive to Ireland, but11
we believe there is scope for a wider systematic comparative analysis of these trends
in state functions.
4. Four Modes of State Activity
We analyse four categories of state agency, organised around functions, as follows:
1. the developmental state
2. the regulatory state
3. the adjudicatory state
4. the moralizing state
4.1 The developmental state
Irish state agencies played a vital role in generating and managing economic
development from an early date. To some degree we find active state supports for the
market even in states with classically liberal economies. The market economy is not
devoid of institutional structures backed by state power: the market economy itself is
a complex of institutional structures supported by a combination of statute law and
bureaucratic procedure. The British state had been heavily involved in direct
productivist activity especially in the colonial context: the East India Company, for
example, or early oil exploration activities, started out as private initiatives that were
then taken over by the state. But the dominant trend from the mid-nineteenth century
on was to move away from mercantilist priorities and to construct a distance between
state institutions and emergent industrial interests. As Polanyi has noted, ‘There was
nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have come into being
merely be allowing things to take their course… laissez-faire itself was enforced by
the state’ (Polanyi 1944, p.139). At the time of Ireland’s independence from Britain in
1922, the British state itself entailed a patchwork of state competences, but the
dominant economic stance was liberal. Then in common with many other European
countries, Britain took major sections of industry and services into public ownership
during the years after World War Two, thus acquiring a significant role in
commercial, productive, distributive and transport activities. The wave of
privatization in Britain and elsewhere during the 1980s and 1990s reversed the trend;
rather than privatization we should perhaps speak of ‘re-privatization’ of many of12
these activities, as a preference for market-led allocative mechanisms took hold across
Europe.
The pattern of state engagement with economic activity in Ireland is rather different. .
The Irish state, at its foundation, inherited the apparatus of the liberal state from
Britain; for the first ten years of its existence, macroeconomic policy was run on
impeccably free-trade, market-conforming lines (Fanning 1978). This was helped by
the retention of the value of the Irish pound at parity with sterling until 1979. But
between 1932 and 1948, Ireland adopted a policy of economic protectionism, and set
out to develop a fledgling domestic industrial base in what was still a largely
agriculturally-based economy. But starting in the 1920s, even prior to protectionism,
we see the development of whole array of state agencies committed to supporting
economic development. Some of these were wholly state-owned commercial bodies
(or ‘semi-state companies’ as they are known in Ireland), taking an early lead in
nationalizing activities such as the rail network and train and bus services, gas, etc.;
and setting up new state companies in areas such as electricity generation, turf
production, sugar and food, etc. From this early date too we can see the establishment
of state-owned investment banks and other financial supports to domestic industry
and agriculture.
These functions of the ‘developmental state’ go well beyond anything comparable in
Britain at this time. However, they share a developmental orientation in common with
the Old Commonwealth states of Canada and Australia, where it has been noted that
‘irregular’ state agencies, diverging from the British prototype, supported a range of
economic activities, including but not confined to public commercial enterprise
(Wettenhall 2003, p.223). And in the US during the 1930s, federal state economic
activism in direct economic activity became more common, most familiarly perhaps
with the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1937 (Selznick
1949). But the scale of Irish state endeavour is perhaps more akin to the roles the state
might play in modern developing countries, as identified by Peter Evans. He has
identified what he calls the ‘demiurge’ role – the direct involvement of the state in
production – and the ‘midwife’ role – active preferential support for domestic
enterprise through the use of tariffs, subsidies and other fiscal instruments (Evans
1995).13
After Ireland adopted outward-oriented economic policies from the early 1960s on,
we see a change in the way the developmental state role functioned. It was from this
time on – and especially after Ireland’s increasing integration into the European
economy after EEC membership in 1973 – that the Industrial Development Authority
(IDA), established in 1949, came into its own. This was not a directive investment
body on the Asian model, but a ‘flexible developmental’ agency committed to an
active role in soliciting and facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI), supported by
the favourable corporate tax regime that had been evolving since the 1950s. It
functioned as a ‘glocal’ facilitator – mediating between global actors and local needs
(FitzGerald 2000; O Riain 2000; Ó Riain 2004).
A further set of development-supporting structures were set up over the following
decades, which can be seen as consistent with the developmental needs of a small
open economy adapting to increased exposure to international trade, in the manner
proposed by Katzenstein (Katzenstein 1985). The following decades see the
emergence of new state bodies to support the export and marketing needs of domestic
industry, and of new functions such as bodies to manage public debt, borrowing, and
public investment needs, property acquisition to build roads, and so on. We also see
the development of state-led tripartite consensus-seeking on economic priorities and
in pay determination; to extend the networks of consultation from economic actors to
non-governmental organizations (Hardiman forthcoming). We might see these trends
as evidence of ‘flexible network governance’ (Hardiman 2006), very much part of the
spectrum of development-oriented state activities.
The expansion of welfare services may also be understood as having a developmental
aspect to it –the ‘compensation hypothesis’ suggests that increasing trade exposure
generates growing demand for stronger state supports to insulate workers against
market hazards (Hardiman et al forthcoming 2008). We might therefore see the
growth of social services through the expansion of health and welfare agencies in
Ireland. As in many other countries, this involves a complex mix of public and private
funding, public and private pooling of authority and responsibility for service
delivery. In the Irish case this is because of the long-established devolution of
responsibility for many welfare services to denominational interests, especially the14
Catholic Church. But it is analogous in this to, for example, the role of the Catholic
Church in service provision in Germany or the Netherlands, or of some Jewish
welfare agencies in Israel. We do not see wholesale shedding of service delivery from
government departments on the British ‘New Public Management’ model at all; it is
only in very recent years that we see new organizational systems emerging in areas
such as health services, prison services and so on.
4,2. The regulatory state
The Irish state, as is common on other countries and especially across the EU,
experienced a wave regulatory agency creation since the 1980s. As Table 3 below
shows, Ireland now has an array of free-standing and semi-independent regulatory
bodies on a par with other EU member states: the regulatory state has come to stay.
Table 3 about here.
But the evidence of our database of Irish state agencies from the foundation of the
state suggests that the regulatory function itself is not new. Certainly the areas into
which state regulation has ventured have changed over the last two decades, and the
manner in which regulation takes place has changed over time. But the concept of
‘regulation’ extends beyond the market understanding of a framework for ensuring
efficiencies in economic activities or supply of services. State regulatory powers must
be understood in a broader sense, if we are fully to comprehend the changing nature
and scope of state functions.
The establishment of authoritative bodies to regulate areas of economic and indeed
social life is therefore not a new one. For example, the great expansion of British
municipal powers in the nineteenth century was strongly based on the enforcement of
public health and sanitation regulations, backed by legal sanction. And part of the
extension of the regulatory power of the modern state has involved the delegation of
public power to private bodies who, under licence, can engage in professional
activities that have a public interest dimension to them. The Irish state inherited these
early regulatory capacities at independence. Hence we see a flurry of new licensing
agencies created between the 1920s and the1950s, particularly in the area of health
care. These grow up alongside some other long-standing agencies exercising15
delegated public powers such as the Law Society of Ireland, established in 1830 both
to train and to authenticate the professional accreditation of legal practitioners. We
must additionally recognise the importance both of government ministries within the
‘old regulatory state’, particularly as licensing authorities. Furthermore the loss of
credibility of the British policing model prior to the establishment of the Free State in
1922 led the newly independent government to establish Garda Síochána (‘guardians
of the peace’) on a broader basis reminiscent of the multi-purpose implementation and
regulatory functions of the Prussian polizei or public authority (Mulcahy
forthcoming).
4.3. The adjudicatory state
The role of the state in conflict resolution and the redress of grievances is, in one
sense, inherent to the functions of the state itself, if by this we mean the capacity to
have recourse to law – criminal, civil, contract, tort – to vindicate rights and recoup
losses. However, we have a more specific understanding of state adjudicatory
functions here, the evolution of which can be tracked through the establishment of
state agencies.
Criminal law and commercial law may perhaps be thought of as the foundation of the
modern state, establishing defence of the person, property rights, and other classic
liberal protections. But we have identified a range of additional functions carried out
by the Irish state, which we believe are also widely in evidence in other states too.
The first wave in the creation of new adjudicatory mechanisms by the Irish state came
during the 1940s, in parallel with the activist role of the state in economic
modernization. This may be seen as the extension of redress facilities beyond the
courts and judicial proceedings and into the heart of economic and commercial life.
In the early 1940s, the then Minister for Industry and Commerce, Seán Lemass, had
attempted to reconfigure trade union organization away from the pluralist and
voluntarist British tradition, but had failed due to constitutional protections for the
rights of the individual to organize. Undaunted, he was instrumental in legislating for
the establishment of the Labour Court, a bipartite and voluntary, but authoritative and
quasi-judicial industrial dispute resolution mechanism. This was intended to play a
leading role in wage determination, and indeed did so for a time. Its importance in16
industrial relations stabilization has fluctuated, but on balance the Labour Court and
its associated agencies have become more firmly institutionalised in industrial
relations over time (MacCarthy 1977; Roche et al 2000). The expansion of
adjudicatory powers in the employment relationship can be further seen in the
creation of agencies such as the Employment Appeals Tribunal.
The use of quasi-judicial agencies to investigate and adjudicate can also be seen in the
use made in Ireland of Tribunals of Inquiry, that is, investigatory bodies set up to
examine policy failures, shortcomings in executive functioning, or suspicion of
political malpractice. Evidence produced at these Tribunals has no standing before the
courts, yet they carry weight and authority. They are not recent innovations; but many
more of them were set up during the 1980s and 1990s to investigate a whole range of
problems (Mac Cárthaigh 2005).
Alongside Tribunals of Inquiry, this period also saw the creation of a new kind of
state agency, the redress board. These were set up to investigate and compensate
victims of state neglect or misconduct across a range of experiences, as an alternative
to the very much more expensive formal judicial route.
In parallel with these boards, other new agencies were also set up to support
individuals in the vindication of their rights in areas such as claims about unfair rents,
planning decisions, etc. We might also note here the establishment of the office of the
Ombudsman in Ireland in 1984 – rather later than comparable institutions elsewhere
in Europe. This is likely to reflect some weakness in the capacity of the individual to
press claims against the state, compared with other countries; this would indeed be
consistent with the argument that Ireland, like Britain, is characterized by particularly
strong executive powers and particularly weak powers available to the legislature in
general and to the parliamentary opposition in particular (Mac Cárthaigh 2005).
What we see nonetheless is an extension of the scope of the rights that individuals
may hope to vindicate through state agencies. We distinguish between statutory and
non-statutory claims, and statutory and non-statutory channels through which these
might be progressed, resulting in a four-way distinction displayed in Table 4 below.17
(Table 4 about here)
Statutory rights, advanced through judicial channels, represent the conventional or
mainstream means of vindicating grievances and seeking adjudication. It would not be
possible to press claims that did not have formal recognition of some sort through the
courts; this is a null category. The interesting categories are the remaining two. We
have seen the development of a range of non-judicial agencies through which
individuals may process claims and seek vindication that have statutory recognition
and vindication. But in addition, we have seen the emergence of a new aspect of the
adjudicatory state: this is where a category of grievances is legitimated by virtue of
being able to produce experiential evidence, and where the means of processing the
claim will accept evidence that falls far short of legally compelling status.
This last category reflects a broadening of the conception of the rights that individuals
may be able to claim, particularly personal rights claims that are made against the
state. Going well beyond investigation of claims of maladministration that are proper
to the role of the Ombudsman, we might see this as a reflection of a more generalized
sense of rights claims and grievance processing. The boundaries of these claims may
be quite fluid and open to being expanded by public opinion or political vulnerability:
for example, a special body during the 1990s was set up to adjudicate claims about
deafness suffered by members of the Army in the course of their duties. That
innovation was inspired in part by concerns about the rise of litigation and the
emergence of ‘a compensation culture’ with adverse impacts both state bodies and on
the insurance industry. A more generalised response was the establishment of a
Personal Injuries Assessment Board in 2004 as an intermediary stage in processing
personal injuries claims. Most claims are intended to be resolved by bureaucratic
assessment, and litigation may only be pursued once those efforts have failed
(Quigley & Binchy 2004). It may be useful to envisage this aspect of state agency
activity as a manifestation of the long fallout of the ‘rights revolution’, the
pervasiveness of rights claims, and therefore the inevitability of demands for
adjudicatory mechanisms (Sunstein 1993). The adjudicatory state is likely to be with
us to stay.18
4.4 The moralizing state
The fourth area in which we see new trends in the role of state agencies is what we
term the moralizing state. The state has always played a central role in the regulation
of private life – most obviously in the statutory regulation of family life, individuals’
rights within the household, custody of children and the extent or indeed absence of
their autonomous rights. States have varied enormously in the way they have
regulated these roles (Therborn 1993; 2004). Moral issues have been so significant
that they are continue to constitute an independent dimension of political values and
party competition, orthogonal to competition on left-right economic issues (Laver
2005; Mair et al 2004). Changes in the conception of the proper boundaries between
personal morality and legal regulation have varied across countries. There has been
some convergence on a liberal agenda, but in no direct or automatic fashion, and the
sequencing of liberalization of laws on availability of contraception, availability of
divorce, and abortion rights has shown great variation across countries over time.
But quite apart from the highly consequential regulation of personal morality, there is
another aspect of state function in the area of public morality, which we term the
moralizing state. This captures the role of the state in seeking to promote a certain
climate of moral values – the state as the ‘engineer of human souls’, albeit in the
context of liberal democratic politics. From our analysis of Irish state agencies, we
can broadly identify two waves of institutional innovation in this area. During the
1920s, we see a concern with promoting Catholic moral values – not because
government represented Catholic interests directly, nor because Catholic Church
interests were directly represented on state bodies, but because in an almost wholly
Catholic and conservative society, these values were in fact widely subscribed to
(Inglis 1998). The Catholic Church did not need to exercise influence to have
legislation congruent with its preferences enacted (thought there is plenty of evidence
that bishops did indeed speak out both directly and indirectly to secure their aims);
there was virtually no organized alternative body of opinion to resist these values.
Therefore we see the establishment of the public censorship agency in the 1920s, as
well as statute law in areas such as the prohibition of contraception, licensing of dance
halls, licensing of the sale and consumption of alcohol.19
By the 1980s and 1990s, the organizational supports for Catholic social values had all
but disappeared. However, what we now see is the emergence of new role for the state
in the promulgation of values. In this case, the consequences are very much less
visible: rather than prohibiting, regulating, and constraining, the objectives are to
shape values and change dispositions through exhortation, discourse, and education.
The agencies in question are concerned with issues ranging from promoting attitudes
of equality, supporting a positive view of older people, opposing racism, promoting
healthy eating and an active lifestyle. In some cases they originated in, or continue to
work through the extension of state funding to non-governmental organizations; in
others the agency was set up de novo by government to pursue some worthy
objective. The new equality agenda has been in evidence since the 1970s, with
acceptance of European directives on sexual equality in the workplace and equal pay
for men and women, which came hard on the heels of admission to EEC membership.
Some of the value-forming agenda in the current period certainly emanates from
Brussels, and may be thought of as an example of the extension of the logic of
appropriateness, of elite consensus on the desirability of particular values, that are
then transmitted into national discourse (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). The practical
policy application of the activities of such agencies, though, can seem somewhat
remote at times. Ireland is not unique in the spread of such agency creation: Lindvall
and Rothstein note the existence in Sweden of a whole layer of ‘ideological state
apparatus’ of just this sort (Lindvall & Rothstein 2006)
4.5 The evolving role of the state
Putting together these four trends, drawn from our analysis of the creation of state
agencies in Ireland, we can analyse trends in the phasing of institutional creation and
functional differentiation. We suggest not only that each of these regime types is
found in the constellation of public agencies established in Ireland but that each has a
traditional and modern form, summarized in table 5.
(Tale 5 about here)
For each of the four modes of state activity, which we have located in patterns of
organizational innovation and functioning, we distinguish between a traditional and a
modern mode of governance, identified in terms of the primary locus of action and
initiative. In the Irish case, the traditional phase is approximately identified as the20
1920s to 1960, and the modern phase from 1960 to the present. The traditional modes
of action involve a direct state role and a proactive policy stance; the modern modes
of action involve more indirect state initiative and a coordinating rather than directive
relationship with social actors. There is some overlap in phasing though: as already
noted, what we have identified as a modern function, the ‘flexible developmental’
approach to industrial policy, was initiated in 1949, though it has evolved
significantly since then.
The analysis begs the further question whether some transition to a late modern form
might also be in train, which might variously be associated with neo-liberal, post-
regulatory or post-modern governance, each of which down-plays the steering role of
central state actors in making and implementing policy. We leave this possibility open
for further exploration at a future date.
5. Legitimacy, efficiency, accountability
Changing forms of state activity between and within the four models discussed in the
previous section have entailed changes in the configurations of institutional actors
which have caused anxieties over the legitimacy of public governance. Legitimacy
has both a substantive dimension (how well are the jobs of government being done?)
and a procedural dimension (for example concerning accountability). Extensive
delegation to agencies and to non-governmental actors, directed at enhancing
efficiency or economy in the provision of public services, may require
reconceptualization of traditions of accountability. We believe that issues of
legitimacy, efficiency, and accountability require a more nuanced treatment than they
often receive.
As long ago as 1970, in a major public review of the state bureaucracy, it was argued
that ‘every new decision to set up a state-sponsored body is an avoidance of the main
issue involved and we suggest that the time has now come to rationalise the whole
structure of the public service’ (Devlin Report 1970, p.90). Yet agencies have
expanded rapidly in number since then. In their recent work on Irish state agencies,
Clancy and Murphy suggested that there is no coherent rationale for the creation of
agencies, that insofar as they are not subject to Freedom of Information legislation21
they can too easily evade appropriate accountability, and that many appointments are
made directly by government ministers and are therefore open at least to the suspicion
of the exercise of political patronage over considerations of probity and competence
(Clancy & Murphy 2006).
Yet recent administrative history in Ireland reveals that there is significant variation in
the nature and function of the public agencies that have been created. With the growth
in the number of agencies has come an extension of the nature and scope of
accountability mechanisms applying to such actors. The parliamentary system has
adapted to this fragmentation through intensifying select committee scrutiny of
agencies. It has accepted innovations of the kind such as the establishment within the
newly set up Health Services Executive (amalgamating a wide range of health
agencies in 2006) of a separate unit to systematically address parliamentary questions
in lieu of the normal expectation of a ministerial response. Statistical evidence, at
least, suggests an intensification of judicial scrutiny of public agencies, alongside the
development of adjudicatory mechanisms, discussed above, some of which are
concerned with holding public agencies to account for their actions. The
establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman and of the Information Commissioner
provides new mechanisms of accountability in respect of maladministration and
failures to fulfil freedom of information requirements. The public sector audit regime,
centred on the ancient office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, has been
extended from probity audit to encompass value for money audits concerned with
investigating the extent to which public agencies meet criteria of effectiveness,
efficiency an economy. Public service recruitment and conditions have been subjected
to new oversight arrangements.
We believe that the classification of organizations by function may help to advance
the debate on these issues. We would suggest that in the developmental, regulatory,
and adjudicatory areas, state agencies must operate in accordance with the logic of
non-majoritarian institutions (Coen & Thatcher 2005; Majone 1996; Thatcher &
Sweet 2002). Nevertheless, a good deal more work needs to be done on issues such as
powers of appointment to the boards of state agencies, as well as lines of
accountability and assessment of efficiency. A more systematic analysis is required
before definitive conclusions can be drawn.22
6. Conclusion
This paper has shown that an organizational analysis of governance can be revealing
in two ways. Firstly, it can remind us of continuities as well as innovations in styles of
governance, and can give us a better purchase on the underlying reasons for variation
both cross-nationally and within a single country over time. Our typology of
traditional and modern is grounded in an analysis of the particular local conditions
that account for institutional evolution, as well as situating the categories within a
more general and cross-nationally relevant comparative context. Secondly, our
typology can highlight previously under-analysed aspects of governance. We think
the changing modalities of the developmental state are far from distinctive to the Irish
case and can be generalized further. We believe that the flourishing literature on
recent aspects of regulatory governance may tend to overlook longer-established
modes of regulation. And we suggest that there are two other governance regimes that
have received relatively little attention to date – the adjudicatory state, and the
moralizing state – and that these are likely to provide fertile grounds for further
comparative analysis.23
Fig.1 Number of state agencies in Ireland, 1924-2004
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Table 3. Irish Regulatory Agencies
SECTOR AGENCY/REGULATOR YEAR
CREATED
Competition Competition Authority 1991
Environment Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 1992
Pharmaceuticals Irish Medicine Board 1995
Telecommunications Commission for Communications
Regulation
(ComReg)
(originally Office of the Director of
Telecommunications Regulation, ODTR)
1996
Food Safety Food Safety Authority of Ireland 1998
Electricity Commission for Energy Regulation (CER)
(originally the Commission for Electricity
Regulation)
1999
Aviation Commission for Aviation Regulation 2001
Financial Markets Irish Financial Services Regulatory
Authority
2002
Accounting Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory
Authority (IAASA)
2003
Taxis Commission for Taxi Regulation 2004
Source: Jonathan Westrup (Westrup 2007).27
Table 4. A typology of the adjudicatory state
Court-like/ legal arena Non-court-like procedures







Non-legal claims - Labour Court
Tribunals of Inquiry
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